Linux kernel 4.18.5

[Moderator Brian Masinick]

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contains an article with information on the latest Linux kernel for your information and potential interest.

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Brian Masinick

[Forum Admin rokytnji]

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Thanks Brian. Good info. I edited your link for ya.

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How to Search for AntiX solutions to your problems

[Forum Admin anticapitalista]

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4.18.4 has just hit the antiX repos

Philosophers have interpreted the world in many ways; the point is to change it.

antiX with runit - leaner and meaner.

[Member fungalnet]

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Are there any measures about Foreshadow or is the patch in intel-ucode?

anti-X - Adélie - obarun - systemd Free Space

[Forum Admin anticapitalista]

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fungalnet wrote:

Are there any measures about Foreshadow or is the patch in intel-ucode?

l1tf-foreshadow-patched-kernels-available/
Debian upstream is supposed to be updating the intel-ucode debs, but it doesn’t seem like it works 100% yet.

spectre-meltdown-checker.sh 
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.39+

Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
Kernel is Linux 4.18.4-antix.2-amd64-smp #1 SMP PREEMPT Wed Aug 22 12:09:25 BST 2018 x86_64
CPU is Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU       M 520  @ 2.40GHz

Hardware check
* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
  * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  UNKNOWN  (is msr kernel module available?)
    * CPU indicates IBRS capability:  UNKNOWN  (is cpuid kernel module available?)
  * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
    * PRED_CMD MSR is available:  UNKNOWN  (is msr kernel module available?)
    * CPU indicates IBPB capability:  UNKNOWN  (is cpuid kernel module available?)
  * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available:  UNKNOWN  (is msr kernel module available?)
    * CPU indicates STIBP capability:  UNKNOWN  (is cpuid kernel module available?)
  * Speculative Store Bypass Disable (SSBD)
    * CPU indicates SSBD capability:  NO 
  * L1 data cache invalidation
    * FLUSH_CMD MSR is available:  UNKNOWN  (is msr kernel module available?)
  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability:  UNKNOWN  (is cpuid kernel module available?)
    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability:  UNKNOWN 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO):  UNKNOWN 
  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Variant 4 (SSB_NO):  UNKNOWN 
  * Hypervisor indicates host CPU might be vulnerable to RSB underflow (RSBA):  UNKNOWN 
  * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems:  NO  (model 0x25 family 0x6 stepping 0x2 ucode 0x11 cpuid 0x0)
  * CPU microcode is the latest known available version:  UNKNOWN  (you have version 0x11 and latest known version is 0x8e)
* CPU vulnerability to the speculative execution attack variants
  * Vulnerable to Variant 1:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 2:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 3:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 3a:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant 4:  YES 
  * Vulnerable to Variant l1tf:  YES 

CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)
* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec:  YES  (1 occurrence(s) found of x86 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec())
* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch:  NO 
* Kernel has mask_nospec64 (arm64):  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization)

CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB, IBRS_FW)
* Mitigation 1
  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS support:  YES 
    * IBRS enabled and active:  YES  (for kernel and firmware code)
  * Kernel is compiled with IBPB support:  YES 
    * IBPB enabled and active:  YES 
* Mitigation 2
  * Kernel has branch predictor hardening (arm):  NO 
  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option:  YES 
    * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler:  YES  (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Full retpoline + IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability)

CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTI)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI):  YES 
  * PTI enabled and active:  YES 
  * Reduced performance impact of PTI:  NO  (PCID/INVPCID not supported, performance impact of PTI will be significant)
* Running as a Xen PV DomU:  NO 
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTI)

CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka 'Variant 3a'
* CPU microcode mitigates the vulnerability:  NO 
> STATUS:  VULNERABLE  (an up-to-date CPU microcode is needed to mitigate this vulnerability)

CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka 'Variant 4'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)
* Kernel supports speculation store bypass:  YES  (found in /proc/self/status)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp)

CVE-2018-3615/3620/3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka 'Foreshadow & Foreshadow-NG'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface:  YES  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)
> STATUS:  NOT VULNERABLE  (Mitigation: PTE Inversion; VMX: conditional cache flushes, SMT vulnerable)

Need more detailed information about mitigation options? Use --explain
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer

• This reply was modified 4 years, 8 months ago by anticapitalista.

Philosophers have interpreted the world in many ways; the point is to change it.

antiX with runit - leaner and meaner.

[Moderator Brian Masinick]

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rokytnji wrote:

Thanks Brian. Good info. I edited your link for ya.

Thanks Roki!

You’re wonderful in the many helpful things you do for this community!

You’re also “cool mahn!”

An old bean, “The Mas” 😎

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Brian Masinick

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